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Abstract: This paper analyses the determinants of business R&D choices. In particular, it provides new empirical evidence on 
the effectiveness of fiscal policies aimed at driving companies to invest in R&D activity. By computing two very accurate proxies 
for firm-specific tax savings achievable when investing in R&D, and by exploiting exogenous changes in fiscal legislation in 
Italy, this study investigates if fiscal considerations affect companies’ choice to invest in R&D and how much to spend in such 
activity. The empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced panel data set composed of 163 Italian companies, covering the years 
2004-2010. A two-step approach has been implemented, by combining a probit and a tobit estimation model. The results deliver 
strong empirical evidence that fiscal incentives significantly affect business R&D choices, by one side, increasing companies’ 
likelihood to invest in R&D, and, by the other, fostering companies’ R&D expenditure. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper analyses the determinants of business R&D 
choices, studying, in particular, the effectiveness of fiscal 
incentives in driving companies to invest in R&D activity. 
During the last decades, an increasing number of 
Governments worldwide adopted policies aimed at fostering 
and stimulating private R&D expenditure. The main 
motivation for the implementation of such policies is the 
consideration that R&D is a key driver for growth, innovation 
and competitiveness of national economies, as strongly 
supported by economic theory and empirical evidence [1-2]. 
However, according to economic theory, companies 
underinvest in R&D activity and markets usually fail to 
provide the socially optimal level of R&D. Indeed, the output 
of R&D has some characteristics of public-good and 
companies investing in R&D cannot entirely internalize its 
benefits. Therefore, public intervention is necessary to drive 
companies to invest in R&D activity, to boost private R&D 
expenditure and, consequently, to raise the social welfare [3]. 
In order to increase business R&D expenditure, 
governments can design policy interventions in two main ways. 
They can offer public R&D resources directly, through grants 
or procurement, or they can provide support indirectly, 
through fiscal incentives, such as R&D tax credits [4-5]. The 
main difference is that direct policies support specific projects, 
having high social potential returns, while fiscal incentives 
allow private companies to select which projects to fund. 
Countries differ significantly in their use of R&D policies. 
The optimal balance of these tools varies significantly from 
country to country, since each policy addresses different 
market failures and stimulates different types of investments. 
In most OECD countries direct government interventions have 
                                                             
1 Hall and Van Reenen (2000) and Mairesse and Mohen (2010) provide accurate 
been the prevailing instrument used to foster private R&D; 
however, in the last two decades, a growing shift towards fiscal 
incentives (in particular tax credits) has been observed in 
several countries [6]. 
At present, R&D fiscal incentives are admitted by more than 
20 OECD countries (from 12 and 18 in 1995 and in 2004, 
respectively). Moreover, not only advanced, but also 
developing countries (such as Brazil, China, India, South 
Africa) provide generous fiscal incentives to support business 
R&D [7-8]. 
Wide empirical literature evaluates the effectiveness of 
R&D policies in increasing R&D expenditure. While much of 
the early literature focused mainly on evidence from US 
companies, over the last few years a growing number of 
micro-econometric studies analyzing other parts of the word 
emerged, such as developing countries [9-11]. 
A wide share of R&D literature focuses on innovation 
inputs of companies (i.e. R&D expenditure, the value of 
tangible assets or employment level), finding convincing 
evidence that such inputs can be affected by fiscal 
incentivizing policies.1 
The most compelling evidence on the positive effect of 
fiscal incentives on R&D choices has been provided by studies 
that compute a user cost of R&D and estimate the response of 
R&D to this price variable, by using a quasi-experimental 
approach [14]. The main limit of this approach is that the price 
variable does not contain a direct measure of fiscal incentives, 
and does not take into account that a wide range of companies’ 
characteristics (such as operating loss position or R&D 
investment level) could affect the possibility of benefiting 
from R&D policies [12]. 
This paper tries to overcome this hurdle of previous 
literature by computing an accurate measure for the firm-
reviews of methods and results obtained in this field [12-13]. 
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specific tax benefit stemming from R&D investment. The 
identification strategy relies on the presence in the Italian 
fiscal system of a double fiscal advantage for companies 
investing in R&D activity: (i) the deductibility of R&D 
expenditure from corporate income tax; (ii) the tax credit 
system for R&D expenditure. Therefore, two direct measures 
of fiscal advantage of R&D investments have been computed. 
The first is the corporate marginal tax rate (MTR), which 
measures the fiscal benefit due to R&D deductibility. The 
second is the marginal tax credit rate (MTCR), which measures 
the tax credit achievable by companies investing in R&D 
activity. 
The empirical analysis is based on a panel of Italian 
companies covering the period 2004-2010. The identification 
strategy exploits the exogenous variation of the statutory tax 
rate and tax base brought about by several fiscal reforms 
implemented in the period. In particular, it takes advantage of 
the introduction in 2006 of the total tax credit system for R&D 
expenditure. 
Few studies in R&D literature are focused on the analysis 
of the Italian context. The main reason for this lack in literature 
is the low diffusion of micro data on Italian companies’ R&D 
expenditure. The Survey on Manufacturing Firms by 
Microcredito-Capitalia and the Italian Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS) by ISTAT represent the two main sources of 
R&D microdata.2 However, the main limit of such surveys is 
that such data are available up to the early 2000s. Bronzini and 
Piselli (2016) overcome the unavailability of updated R&D 
data by focusing on patent applications and investigating how 
fiscal incentives could affect the output of R&D activity [17]. 
However, the use of patent application has some limitation: 
fiscal incentives could have an impact on R&D expenditure 
but no effect on the number of patent applications. Usually the 
achievement of a patent requires a long period and it is 
possible that a patent does not originate from R&D activity. 
This paper overcomes the patents’ data limitation and the 
unavailability of recent survey micro-data by using the balance 
sheet data of Italian companies provided by ORBIS (a Bureau 
van Dick database), containing detailed information on 
companies’ R&D expenditure. 
Finally, this study provides some significant policy 
implications, showing if and how much R&D policy adopted 
in Italy has been effective in fostering and increasing business 
R&D expenditure. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 provides background information on the fiscal treatment of 
R&D investments in the Italian context. Section 3 develops the 
main hypotheses tested in this study and describes the research 
design. Section 4 illustrates sample composition, describes the 
data and presents summary statistics of the key variables. 
Section 5 discusses the estimation results and provides some 
                                                             
2 Using such surveys, Hall, Lotti and Mairesse (2009), and Cerulli and Potì (2012) 
find that companies receiving a subsidy significantly increase R&D activity [15-
16]. 
3 Different IRAP tax rates are applied to companies belonging to specific economic 
sectors: for example, a tax rate higher than the statutory one is applied to banks and 
financial entities or to insurance corporations; on the contrary a reduced tax rate is 
robustness check analysis. The final section provides some 
concluding remarks. 
2. R&D Fiscal Incentives: MTR and 
MTCR 
The allowance of fiscal incentives represents the main 
public policy instrument adopted by Governments worldwide 
in order to enhance and to increase business R&D expenditure. 
The Italian fiscal system imposes two different taxes on 
companies: IRES and IRPEG. 
The first is the corporate income tax, IRES (Imposta sul 
Reddito delle Società). The IRES tax base is constituted by 
accounting income (as defined by the Italian Civil Code), 
subject to some adjustments. From 2004 to 2007 the IRES tax 
remained stable at 33%; it has been reduced to 27.5% from 2008 
onwards. The corporate tax regime allows companies with 
negative taxable income to carry-forward losses, to offset the 
taxable income, up to the following 5 years. 
In addition to IRES, Italian companies carrying out 
productive activities are subject to the payment of the regional 
production tax, IRAP (Imposta sul Reddito delle Attività 
Produttive). Up to 2007, the statutory rate of IRAP has been 
4.25%, while it has been reduced to 3.9% by the 2008 financial 
law. However, considered that IRAP is a tax levying on a 
regional basis, regions are allowed to increase or decrease the 
standard rate up to 0.92%.3 
The main fiscal incentive allowed to Italian companies 
investing in R&D is the possibility to deduct fully R&D 
expenses from IRES tax base. The deduction has the effect of 
reducing the marginal cost of R&D investments faced by firms 
[12]. 
In addition to deductibility, in 2006, in order to foster and 
increase business R&D investments, the Italian fiscal authority 
adopted a total tax credit system for R&D expenditure. 4 
Starting from 2007, any company involved in R&D was 
allowed to obtain a tax credit equal to 10% of R&D 
expenditure. The tax credit could not exceed the value of 15 
million euro5 in each fiscal year. The tax credit could be used 
to pay both IRES and IRAP. 
Therefore, due to R&D deductibility a marginal increase in 
R&D expenditure implies a reduction in tax liabilities 
measured by MTR, which is deﬁned as the present value of 
current and expected future taxes paid on an additional unit of 
income earned today. 
If a ﬁrm has positive taxable income, the MTR is equal to 
the statutory IRES tax rate. Otherwise, if a ﬁrm has no taxable 
income in year t, an additional unit of income earned reduces 
the losses that can be carried forward and used to offset the 
taxable income, during the following 5 years. In this case, the 
applied to the agricultural sector. 
4 R&D fiscal incentives appeared for the first time in Italian fiscal system during 
the nineties, when tax credits were allowed to small and medium firms employing 
new R&D workers. 
5 Financial law no. 244/2007 (article 1, section 66) increased this limit to 50 million 
euro. 
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MTR is equal to the discounted value of the taxes paid on the 
marginal unit of income in the ﬁrst year when the ﬁrm is 
expected to have positive taxable income. 
In order to compute the true value of MTR, two sets of 
information are required. The first regards the corporate 
taxation rules, namely the level of the statutory tax rate. The 
second is the expectation of future income flows. Following 
[18], the value of expected taxable income has been proxied 
by using the Graham-Shevlin methodology [19-22]. Then, 
these values have been used to compute the marginal tax rate 
for each company in the sample.6 
Due to the tax credit, a marginal increase in R&D 
expenditure implies a reduction in tax liabilities measured by 
MTCR, which is equal to the marginal increase in the tax credit, 
due to a marginal increase in R&D expenditure. 
The computation of MTCR requires knowledge of the 
statutory tax rate, R&D expenditure, taxable income and 
current taxes (IRES and IRAP). 
In year t, an additional unit of company’s R&D expenditure 
implies a marginal increase in tax credit (and hence a marginal 
reduction in a company’s tax burden) equal to IRES/IRAP 
statutory tax rate, if three conditions are met: 
(i) the value of current tax is positive; 
(ii) the value of current tax is higher than 10% of R&D 
expenditure; 
(iii) 10% of R&D expenditure is lower than the threshold 
(euro 15 million in 2007, and 50 from 2008 onwards). 
In any different scenario, a marginal increase in R&D 
expenditure would not affect the tax burden, so MTCR would 
be equal to zero. 
3. Research Design 
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the 
effectiveness of R&D policies adopted in Italy to drive 
companies to invest in R&D activity. The empirical analysis 
investigates the existence of a fiscal effect affecting both the 
decision of companies to invest in R&D and how much to 
spend in such activity. 
The identification strategy relies on the tax-burden 
reductions achievable by companies investing in R&D. Due to 
the possibility to deduct R&D expenses from IRES taxable 
income, and to receive R&D tax credits, companies facing a 
higher marginal tax rate and/or a higher marginal tax credit 
rate, could be more likely to invest in R&D. Therefore, the 
empirical analysis tests whether an increase in MTR and/or 
MTCR entails an increase in both the probability that 
companies will invest in R&D and in private R&D 
expenditure. Hence, the hypotheses to be tested are stated 
formally as: 
H1: The probability to invest in R&D increases with an 
increase in MTR and/or MTCR. 
                                                             
6 In order to compute the MTRs a microsimulation model has been developed. 
Further details on such methodology are available upon request. 
7 The choice of the random effects model is driven by the structure of the sample. 
Since the empirical analysis is based on a not exhaustive sample extracted by a 
population, the random effects model allows to make inference about the 
population from which these cross-section data came from. 
H2: R&D expenditure increases with an increase in MTR 
and/or MTCR. 
The empirical analysis adopts a two-step approach. The first 
step is focused on companies’ decision to invest in R&D. A 
binary choice model has been estimated, using as dependent 
variable a dummy showing companies investing in R&D 
activity. The multivariate analysis relies on a probit random 
effects model.7 
The second step investigates the effects of fiscal benefits on 
R&D intensity, measured by the ratio between R&D 
expenditure and total assets [23]. The dependent variable is a 
doubly truncated random variable, which varies between 0 and 
1. A common approach to dealing with the problem of 
censored variables is the tobit model [24-25]. 
The baseline specification is the following: 
𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑀𝑇𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (1) 
where 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡  is the dummy variable showing companies 
investing in R&D in the first step of the empirical analysis, 
while it is equal to the value of R&D expenditure expressed as 
a proportion of total assets in the second step. The parameters 
of interest are 𝛽  and 𝛾 , which capture the fiscal effect on 
companies’ R&D decisions. 
The vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡  contains several factors identified by 
previous empirical literature as able to drive R&D companies’ 
behaviour. Prior research has found that companies’ size is an 
important determinant of R&D expenditure and innovation 
activity. Larger companies could benefit from economies of 
scale and scope, have a better organizational structure and are 
less exposed to capital market imperfections [26-27]. In line 
with previous literature, a positive link between company’s 
size and R&D choice is expected: the larger the company is, 
the higher would be both its probability to invest in R&D and 
R&D expenditure. Two variables have been used to proxy for 
this “size effect”. The first, S, is the log of sales [28]. The 
second, LARGE, is a dummy variable based on companies’ 
added value. Following [29], the variable LARGE is set equal 
to one if the added value of a company is above its median 
value, otherwise it results equal to zero. Moreover, the number 
of employees could provide a measure of companies’ size 
[23].8 Due to unavailability of such information for several 
companies in several years, the inclusion of this control 
significantly decreases the number of observations. Therefore, 
this additional variable is used to test the robustness of the 
main empirical results. 
Companies’ age could be a significant factor linked to R&D 
choices. Several studies have claimed that older firms are more 
reluctant to pursue innovation, while younger firms have a 
higher propensity towards R&D [30-31]. The empirical 
analysis controls for the age of companies, using the log of the 
number of years since its foundation, expecting to find a 
negative correlation between companies’ age and R&D. 
R&D choices could be affected by market competition. This 
8 Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) underline that using the number of employees as 
control variable endogeneity may arise: companies benefitting from fiscal 
incentives may hire R&D staff, and thus their employment increases [23]. However, 
R&D staff represents a small proportion of all employees of Italian companies. 
Hence, R&D fiscal incentives could affect the number of R&D staff, but this change 
is not significant compared to the total number of employees. 
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relationship is widely discussed in the literature. The standard 
theoretical model predicts that innovation activity should 
decline with competition, since a higher competition lowers 
monopolistic profits of successful innovators [32]. However, 
several empirical works find a positive correlation between 
market competition and innovation [33]. To control for the 
impact of competition, following [23, 31], among the controls 
it is included the market share variable, relating company’s 
sales to those of its economic sector. 
The geographical location could be an important element to 
take into account, as provincial R&D incentives could differ 
[34-35]. To control for this aspect, three regional dummies 
have been included in the regression model: North-East, 
North-West and Centre-Southern regions.9 
R&D distribution of firms varies significantly by sectors. 
More innovative companies are typically concentrated in 
technologically advanced industries, whereas companies in 
more traditional sectors are less likely to invest in R&D [23, 
35]. To control for these differences, industry dummies, 
measured on the NACE two-digit level, have been included in 
the empirical model. 
R&D choices could be affected positively by past 
innovative practices, proxied by the number of patents 
achieved by companies or by the presence of R&D 
departments [36-37]. Moreover, companies' trade openness 
could affect R&D [34]. Companies active in exportation 
usually face higher international competition and are this 
could affect their likelihood to strengthen their 
competitiveness through R&D. These are arguably the most 
important omitted variables not included in the empirical 
analysis, due to data unavailability. 
4. Sample Composition and Description 
The empirical analysis is based on a panel data set 
composed of Italian companies observed over the years 2004-
10. Several reforms of Italian corporate income tax, together 
with the introduction of a tax credit for R&D expenditure in 
2007, make this period particularly interesting and provide an 
ideal setting for testing the effect of fiscal variables on 
companies’ R&D choices. 
The data are gathered from the ORBIS database, containing 
accounting information on Italian corporations. Initially, it has 
been identified a balanced panel composed by 163 companies 
having a known value of R&D expenditure (for which the 
value of R&D expenditure is not a missing data) and balance 
sheet data in every year between 1999 and 2010.10 The result 
of the exclusion of inconsistent data11 is an unbalanced panel 
data set. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the fiscal status of 
the companies included in the sample. The percentage of 
companies having positive income before tax and R&D is 
almost stable from 2004 to 2007 (82-84%), while it decreases 
from 2008 onwards, declining to 72.7% in 2010. The decrease 
in the number of profitable companies is basically due to the 
economic crisis. 
Table 1 provides also information about the total value of 
R&D expenditure over the period 2004-2010. The data show 
that sample companies increased continuously and strongly 
the value of investment in R&D up to 2007, while the value 
settled in at the value of euro 4 million during the years 2007-
2010. 
 
Table 1. Profit status of companies and total value of R&D expenditure. 
Fiscal 
Year 
Observation
s 
Income before taxes and 
R&D expenditure Total R&D 
expenditure 
Positive 
Null or 
negative 
2004 159 134 25 1,059 
2005 162 135 27 3,483 
2006 162 133 29 3,859 
2007 162 133 29 4,366 
2008 161 112 49 4,263 
2009 161 103 58 4,735 
2010 161 117 44 4,256 
Notes: The values of R&D expenditures are expressed in euro millions. 
Source: Authors’ calculation on ORBIS data. 
 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. The dummy 
variable for companies investing in R&D (R&DC) shows that 
on average 17.2% of sample observations records a positive 
value of R&D expenditure. The empirical model uses two 
different proxies for R&D intensity. The first (R&DI) is the 
ratio between R&D expenditure and total assets, and ranges 
between 0 and 0.362 (reaching a mean value of 0.006); the 
alternative proxy (ALT_R&DI) is the ratio between R&D 
expenditure and total number of employees, and has a lower 
mean and a lower maximum value. By comparing fiscal 
variables, it emerges that MTR has a mean value higher than 
MTCR (respectively 0.262 and 0.107), implying that on 
average the fiscal benefit due to the deductibility of R&D 
expenditure is higher than the one due to R&D tax credit. 
 
 
 
                                                             
9  The choice to use three macro-regions is due to the peculiarity of sample 
composition, characterized by only few companies based in the Centre and 
Southern regions. 
10 A precise simulation of the marginal tax rate implies the knowledge of the value 
of losses of previous 4 years to carry-forward. Therefore, it has been necessary to 
impose sample companies to have balance sheet data available in every year 
between 1999 and 2010. 
11 I dropped observations having negative values of some variables, such as R&D 
expenditure or sales. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for all variables, pooled for years 2004-2010 (obs.1,128). 
Definition Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Dummy variable for companies with a positive R&D expenditure R&DC 0.172 0.378 0 1 
R&D intensity ( in % of total assets) R&DI 0.006 0.021 0 0.362 
R&D intensity ( in % of employees) ALT_R&DI 0.001 0.004 0 0.032 
Marginal tax rate MTR 0.262 0.096 0 0.33 
Marginal tax credit rate MTCR 0.158 0.166 0 0.382 
Natural log of sales S 5.749 1.905 0.367 11.591 
Dummy variable for large companies LARGE 0.563 0.496 0 1 
Natural log of company’s age AGE 3.474 0.985 0 5.063 
Market competition MC 0.080 0.209 0.001 1 
Natural log of number of employees EMP 7.149 1.903 1.792 12.206 
 
5. Estimation Results 
For the sake of comparison with prior literature, the 
empirical analysis starts by investigating the effect of non-
fiscal variables on companies’ R&D choices. 
The results of the probit analysis (Column 1.a of Table 3) 
show that, as expected, the bigger the company is, the higher 
is the probability to invest in R&D. In line with previous 
literature [28], the log of company’s sales results positively 
and significantly linked to companies’ likelihood to invest in 
R&D. On the contrary, LARGE results not statistically 
significant. AGE is significantly and negatively linked to the 
probability to invest in R&D, confirming that older companies 
have a lower propensity to invest in R&D than younger ones 
[28, 23]. Finally, market competition results not a significant 
factor affecting R&D investment choice. 
The tobit analysis (Column 1. b of Table 3) confirms that 
size and age of a company are significant factors affecting 
R&D expenditure: the bigger or the younger the company is, 
the higher the value of R&D expenditure is. Contrary to the 
probit analysis, it emerges that market competition affects 
R&D expenditure significantly and negatively. In line with the 
theoretical prediction [32], R&D expenditure decreases in the 
presence of higher market competition: the higher competition 
lowers monopolistic profits of successful innovator, leading 
companies to reduce R&D expenditure. 
When fiscal variables are added to the controls, it emerges 
a strong evidence of a fiscal effect influencing companies’ 
R&D decisions (columns 2 of Table 3). The positive and 
strongly significant coefficients associated to MTR show that 
the higher the tax saving due to R&D deductibility, the more 
likely companies to invest in R&D and to increase R&D 
expenditure. Regression results imply that, due to R&D 
deductibility, a mean-level unit increase in the marginal tax 
rate raises the probability to invest in R&D by about 62% and 
R&D expenditure by about 21%, respectively. 
 
Table 3. Determinants of R&D investments. 
Independent Variables Expected Signs 1 2 3 
   (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Fiscal 
variable 
MTR + 
  0.618*** 0.211*** 0.615*** 0.221*** 
  (0.133) (0.051) (0.131) (0.053) 
MTCR N.S.S. 
  0.193** 0.047** 0.213*** 0.056** 
  (0.060) (0.019) (0.058) (0.019) 
Other 
controls 
S + 
0.063*** 0.014*** 0.054*** 0.012*** 0.055*** 0.012*** 
(0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) 
LARGE + 
0.001 0.007 -0.007 0.004 0.003 0.009 
(0.032) (0.009) (0.031) (0.009) (0.029) (0.009) 
AGE - 
-0.020** -0.005* -0.022** -0.005** -0.031*** -0.008** 
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) 
MC ? 
-0.018 -0.033** -0.008 -0.028** 0.002 -0.017 
(0.047) (0.012) (0.042) (0.011) (0.042) (0.012) 
Regional dummies No No Yes 
Industry dummies No No Yes 
Observations 1128 1128 1128 
Notes: column (a) provides the marginal effects (calculated at the means of the independent variables) of the impact of fiscal and non-fiscal factors on 
the probability to invest in R&D; column (b) provides the estimates of the impact of control variables on R&D expenditure. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
Regressions in columns (a) use as dependent variable R&DC, a dummy variable showing companies investing in R&D activity; regression in columns (b) use as 
dependent variable R&DI, the ratio between R&D expenditure and total assets. MTR is the marginal tax rate computed using the Graham-Shevlin methodology; 
MTCR is the marginal tax credit deriving from R&D investment; S is the log of sales; LARGE is a dummy variables showing companies having an added value 
above its median value; AGE is the log of the number of year since firm’s foundation; MC is the ratio between firm’s and industry’s sales. 
Superscript asterisks indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (*). 
 
 
 
Also MTCR affects positively and significantly both the 
probability to invest in R&D and R&D expenditure. This 
finding confirms the expectations that an increase in the tax 
credit due to R&D investment has positive effects on 
companies’ R&D choices. Comparing the coefficients 
estimated for both the fiscal variables, it emerges that R&D 
behavior responds stronger to an increase in MTR than in 
MTCR: a mean-level unit increase in the marginal tax credit 
rate raises the probability to invest in R&D by about 19% and 
R&D expenditure by about 5%, respectively. 
The inclusion of the fiscal variables changes neither the sign 
nor the significance level of non-fiscal control variables. 
The inclusion of regional and industrial dummies does not 
significantly affect the relationship between control variables 
and companies’ R&D choices. The results in Columns 3 are 
very similar to those estimated for the main model in terms of 
magnitude, sign and significance level. For expositional 
convenience, Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients neither 
for regional nor for industry dummies. However, it should be 
pointed out that regional dummies are not statistically linked 
to either the probability to invest in R&D and R&D 
expenditure, showing that the presence of different regional 
R&D incentives does not affect business R&D choices. 
Table 4 reports the results of several sensitivity and 
robustness checks. First, to proxy for the fiscal saving due to 
R&D deductibility, in alternative to the marginal tax rate, the 
taxable income dummy (TID) has been used. The taxable 
income dummy is a dichotomous variable based on the sign of 
current-period taxable income before R&D deductions [20]: 
TID takes a value equal to the top statutory tax rate for firms 
having positive income before taxes and before R&D 
expenditure, and zero otherwise. The estimation results 
(Columns 1 of Table 4) confirm that an increase in fiscal 
benefit due to R&D deductibility affects positively both the 
decision of companies to invest in R&D and R&D expenditure, 
even if the effect of TID on R&D choices is almost half of 
those estimated for MTR (Columns 3 of Table 3). 
 
Table 4. Robustness. 
Independent Variables Expected Signs 1 2 3 
   (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Fiscal 
variable 
MTR + 
  0.394** 0.128** 0.514** 0.030** 
  (0.139) (0.041) (0.160) (0.009) 
TID + 
0.370*** 0.133***     
(0.094) (0.037)     
MTCR N.S.S. 
0.209*** 0.053** 0.247*** 0.060** 0.222** 0.009** 
(0.059) (0.019) (0.066) (0.020) (0.078) (0.004) 
Other 
controls 
S + 
0.058*** 0.013*** -0.042** -0.020*** 0.077*** 0.003*** 
(0.008) (0.003) (0.017) (0.006) (0.010) (0.001) 
LARGE + 
-0.002 0.008 -0.036 0.003 0.016 0.001 
(0.030) (0.009) (0.036) (0.010) (0.039) (0.002) 
AGE - 
-0.028** -0.007** -0.039*** -0.010** -0.036** -0.002** 
(0.009) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.012) (0.001) 
MC ? 
0.001 -0.018 0.044 -0.007 0.005 -0.003 
(0.044) (0.012) (0.048) (0.011) (0.055) (0.003) 
EMP + 
  0.131*** 0.039***   
  (0.018) (0.007)   
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,128 794 794 
Notes: column (a) provides the marginal effects (calculated at the means of the independent variables) of the impact of fiscal and non-fiscal factors on 
the probability to invest in R&D; column (b) provides the estimates of the impact of control variables on R&D expenditure. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
Regressions in columns (a) use as dependent variable R&DC, a dummy variable showing companies investing in R&D; regressions in columns (b) use 
as dependent variable R&DI, the ratio R&D expenditure to total assets. MTR is the marginal tax rate computed using the Graham-Shevlin 
methodology; MTCR is the marginal tax credit deriving from R&D investment; S is the log of sales; LARGE is a dummy variables showing companies 
having an added value above its median value; AGE is the log of the number of year since firm’s foundation; MC is the ratio between firm’s and 
industry’s sales; EMP is the log of total number of employees. In columns (1) I use an alternative proxy for marginal tax rate, TID, equal to the top 
statutory tax rate if a company has a positive income before taxes and R&D expenditure; in columns (2) I add to controls the log of the number of 
employees; in columns 3 I use as dependent variable ALT_R&DI, the ratio between R&D expenditure and total number of employees. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Superscript asterisks indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.10 (*). 
 
 
In line with previous literature, the log of the number of 
employees is added to the control variables as measure of 
companies’ size. The unavailability of such information for 
several companies over many years, implies a reduction in the 
number of observations. The estimation results (Columns 2 of 
Table 4) confirm the findings reached by previous literature, 
showing that an increase in the number of employees has a 
positive impact on R&D choices. However, the inclusion of 
the number of employees among the controls reduces 
significantly the magnitude of the positive effect of MTR on 
both the decision to invest in R&D and R&D magnitude, and 
increases the magnitude of the positive effect of MTCR. 
Finally, the main analysis has been replicated by using an 
alternative proxy for R&D intensity, computed as the ratio 
between R&D expenditure and total number of employees. 
The estimation results (Columns 3 of Table 4) are very similar 
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to those obtained when estimating the main model (Columns 
3 of Table 3). However, it emerges that an increase in both 
MTR and MTCR has a lower effect on R&D expenditure (the 
coefficients decrease from 22.1% to 3% and from 5.6% to 
0.9%, respectively). 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigates whether fiscal incentives affect 
companies’ R&D choices, focusing the analysis on the effect 
of marginal tax saving due to R&D deductibility and to R&D 
tax credits. The results deliver strong evidence that fiscal 
variables affect companies’ decision to invest in R&D, such as 
R&D expenditure. 
The positive and strongly significant coefficients associated 
with MTR show that the higher the tax saving due to R&D 
deductibility is, the more likely companies are to invest in 
R&D and to increase R&D expenditure. MTCR positively and 
significantly affects both the probability to invest in R&D and 
R&D expenditure, too. These findings confirm that R&D 
deductibility and R&D tax credits are instruments able to 
affect companies’ R&D choices, increasing companies’ 
likelihood to invest in R&D, and, fostering companies’ R&D 
expenditure. 
The main limit of this study is that the empirical analysis is 
based on a sample composed of a few firms, which is not fully 
representative of the overall population of Italian companies. 
However, it would be interesting to replicate this analysis 
using different data and verifying whether it is possible to find 
convincing evidence on the robustness of the main results. 
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